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I. INTRODUCTION
Standard restitution involves the unjust enrichment of a defendant at the
expense of a plaintiff, making the overall thrust of the remedy (if not its
precise shape and extent) reasonably clear. Cases of successive frauds—in
which Swindler defrauds first A, then B, then C—do not fit the usual profile.
Swindler has no assets with which to meet his many liabilities—any property
in his hands belongs to his victims—so he is out of the picture. The
* Distinguished Senior Lecturer, University of Texas School of Law; Reporter, Restatement
Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. Portions of this article appeared in different form in
Andrew Kull, Defences to Restitution Between Victims of a Common Fraud, in Defences in Unjust Enrichment
229–54 (Dyson et al. eds., 2016). The author is indebted to Samuel Bray, Ward Farnsworth, Daniel
Friedmann, Launcelot Henderson, and Calvin Johnson for pertinent comments and suggestions.
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Swindler’s victims, however, may have restitution claims against each other.
Swindler might have repaid A with funds obtained by fraud from B, or even
persuaded B to repay A directly. Does B have a claim in restitution against
A to get this money back? Defendants in these cases will deny that they
have been enriched at the expense of the plaintiffs in anything like the
normal way: they will describe themselves instead as fellow victims of an
absent wrongdoer—survivors of a common casualty. Instead of the claims
and defenses used to work out justice in standard restitution scenarios,
justice between fellow victims tends toward a rule of share and share alike.
The contemporary setting of the problem, and the place where some new
law is being made, is in the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme. Numerous victims
have delivered money, securities, or other property to Swindler, and there
are some assets on hand that are clearly the product of the fraud. Accounts
have been frozen, a receiver has been appointed, and the question is how to
distribute whatever it is possible to marshal. Because everything within
reach of the receiver is property obtained by fraud from one victim or
another, allocating the assets in receivership means deciding restitution
claims—whether individual or collective—between the victims inter se.
Everyone accepts the idea that the distribution should be “equitable”; that
“equality is equity”; and that equal distribution in this context means
“ratably in proportion to losses”—a rule of no priority between fraud
victims, and a rule so intuitive it is scarcely perceived as a rule. That leaves
the question of how the victims’ losses should be measured. Established
rules of property and restitution start from “net losses,” determined ex post,
once the music stops and the facts come to light. The more recent intuition
of judges (and their receivers) is that the victims’ relative entitlements should
be based on what they originally lost—their initial investments—not on how
things ended up.1
The choice between net losses and original investments as the basis of
allocation can lead to very different outcomes. Assume that each of several
victims has made a one-time investment of $1,000. So far, they are all
identically situated. But their ex post net losses will vary significantly in any
case in which (i) an investor has previously received any return of that
investment, such as by dividend or withdrawal; (ii) an investor is able to
identify and reclaim specific assets in the hands of the receiver, or both.
1. I described this recent development in an earlier essay, combining an account of the principal
decisions with speculation about their motivation. See Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 291, 303–04 (2014).
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Standard property rules dictate that either circumstance reduces net loss by
allowing the fortunate victim to recoup some of what was given up. In the
first instance, repayments to defrauded investors may be retained by them,
free of the claims of fellow victims, because the repaid victims are allowed
an affirmative defense to restitution as bona fide payees. In the second,
misappropriated property that remains identifiable may be retaken by its
defrauded owner from anyone not qualifying as a bona fide purchaser.
Taking net loss as the basis of comparison thus means that claimants who
began on an equal footing—as victims of the same fraud to which they
contributed identical amounts—may have suffered unequally as a result of
circumstances that are essentially fortuitous. Traditional rules about net loss
accept the fact that some fraud victims may be luckier than others. By
contrast, allocating losses in proportion to original investments—a rule of
share and share alike—disregards or overrides both the circumstances and
the legal rules that produce a disproportionate incidence of loss.
If our current sense of equity between fraud victims requires that the
benchmark for ratable distribution be shifted from net losses to original
investments, two important rules of law will have to be overcome or
ignored. The first major obstacle is the affirmative defense allowed to a
“creditor/payee” (one who receives money in satisfaction of a preexisting
debt) to whom payment is made with money to which a third person would
otherwise have a valid claim in restitution—such as money obtained from
that third person by fraud. This defense is one branch of the standard net
loss calculation because it is what permits a Ponzi victim to retain any funds
he has been fortunate enough to withdraw from the scheme before it
collapses—even when it is clear that such withdrawals were necessarily
funded from the investments of subsequent, less-fortunate victims.
The second obstacle to be overcome is an even more basic rule of equity:
the idea that an owner from whom property has been obtained by fraud may
retake it, so long as it can be identified, until it comes into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser. The residue of a Ponzi scheme, coming into the hands
of a receiver, sometimes includes assets (such as goods or registered
securities) that are easily recognizable as identifiable property of one of the
victims. Meanwhile, other victims of the same fraud, who parted with just
as much, are unable to identify any of their property in the wreckage of the
scheme. Orthodoxy returns identifiable property to its fortunate owners,
necessarily reducing their net loss from the fraud and increasing the net loss
of their fellow victims—by diminishing the assets available for ratable
distribution. Whether or not this seems fair depends on the scope we are
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willing to accord to chance and luck in human affairs. A court that
condemns a net loss comparison on the ground that it is “merely fortuitous”
must find a way around the owner’s ordinary right to reclaim his own
property.
One of the most prominent features of restitution remedies is the “tracing
fictions.” These are longstanding equitable rules that displace the legal logic
of ownership to do justice in particular cases. Specifically, the rules allow a
claimant to “trace” (or identify and reclaim) property that is no longer
identifiable in fact—because it has been combined or “commingled” with
other property, making it impossible to say who owns what. Recent Ponzi
decisions displace ordinary property rules in the same way, but in the
opposite direction. Confronted with a situation in which property is in fact
identifiable, and where recognition of individual ownership results in
perceived injustice, courts have treated the property as if it were
commingled. Commingled property of fraud victims—uncontroversially—
is subject to ratable distribution between them. Disregarding the owner’s
right to retake identifiable property requires that a lot of existing law be altered
or ignored, but fictional commingling possibly does no more violence to
ordinary property rules than fictional tracing.
The effect of a receiver’s intuition about the equitable distribution
between Ponzi victims is to adjudicate what is implicitly a restitution claim
by one fraud victim against another. Claims of this kind present, in acute
form, a fundamental, unanswered question about the defenses to restitution
claims generally. Between innocent parties, to what extent should a liability
in restitution depend on the “balance of equities” between them, as opposed
to a more easily administered rule of thumb? Centuries of authority might
be cited for a rule that money paid by mistake is subject to restitution, except
where the recipient has been led to change position on the strength of the
payment—thereby making restitution inequitable. Inescapable conflicting
authority treats the recipient as a bona fide purchaser of the money—and
hence immune to liability—if the mistaken payment was taken in
satisfaction of a preexisting debt. Such a rule of thumb offers unmistakable
advantages, but there are cases in which the equities of the parties demand
closer attention. How to identify those cases is the unanswered question,
but cases of restitution between fraud victims appear to be among them.
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II. THE CREDITOR/PAYEE AS PURCHASER FOR VALUE
Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment describes in unqualified
terms an affirmative defense for the “bona fide payee,” alias “bona fide
creditor.” According to both the newer Restatement and its 1937 predecessor,
a payment that would otherwise be subject to restitution—typically, because
the payor has been the victim of fraud or mistake—may be retained by the
payee if it was taken, without notice, in satisfaction or reduction of a valid
obligation.2
The near-immunity of the creditor/payee to a liability in restitution is the
product of two related developments. The first is the expansion of the
doctrine of bona fide purchase that was brought about by extending the
range of what would count as “valuable consideration” (or “value,” for
short) in the transaction by which a purchaser acquired the property in
question. In the traditional, equitable version of the rule, it was doubtful
that “value” was given when property was taken in discharge of an
antecedent (pre-existing) indebtedness, and taking property merely as security
for an antecedent debt was almost certainly not a purchase for value. The
question was salient in a single specialized context: that of transactions in
negotiable instruments. In this quintessentially commercial setting, doubts
about the status of antecedent debt as value were gradually overridden: first
by the weight of 19th-century judicial authority, later by statute. The
controversy in its judicial phase produced a sanguinary conflict between U.S.
jurisdictions over what was then perceived as a question of high principle.
In its statutory resolution—initially by the Negotiable Instruments Law of
1896 and, ultimately, by the Uniform Commercial Code3—questions of
high principle were paved over and rendered invisible. Our persistent lack

2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011); cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1937). (“An assignee of a
non-negotiable chose in action who, having paid value therefore, has received payment from the
obligor is under no duty to make restitution although the obligor had a defense thereto, if the transferee
made no misrepresentation and did not have notice of the defense.”).
3. The traditional problem areas in the definition of “value,” described in the text, were
eliminated by the U.C.C. for transactions within its scope. According to U.C.C. § 1-204, “a person
gives value for rights if the person acquires them . . . (2) as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction
of, a preexisting claim; . . . or (4) in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract.” U.C.C. § 1-204 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). For transactions in
negotiable instruments—as an exception to this general definition—U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1) retains the
traditional rule by which a promise constitutes value only to the extent the promise has been performed.
U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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of certainty about equity between competing fraud victims is a hint of
unresolved problems lying beneath the surface.
The second concurring development was the decision by Warren Seavey
and Austin W. Scott, reporters of the original Restatement of Restitution,4 to
adopt the commercial rule about antecedent debt for cases in which a
claimant’s money or property had been transferred, as a result of fraud or
mistake, to an innocent creditor/payee.5 This was itself an important
extension of the commercial rule, since cases of fraud and mistake within
the Restatement included many situations beyond the scope of the uniform
laws and outside the U.C.C. even today. In their accompanying reporters’
notes, Seavey and Scott acknowledged that the rule they called “discharge
for value” might not do justice in cases where money of one fraud victim
was used to repay another, but they announced that equities between the
victims in such cases were irrelevant.6
It is in precisely these cases of victim v. victim restitution that the blanket
defense afforded to a creditor/payee against a liability in restitution—
prefigured by the commercial rules about antecedent debt as value, endorsed
by both Restatements of Restitution—has most often been questioned. A
perceptible sense that the rule does not do justice between fraud victims is
explained by the derivation of the modern doctrine. Purely equitable in its
inception, the defense of purchase for value hardened and crystallized as it
was applied to commercial transactions in which finality and predictability
were felt to be more important than any balance of equities between the
parties. However, when it comes to be applied to transactions as far outside
the ordinary course of business, such as restitution between fraud victims,
its inadequacy may still be felt.
A. What Is “Value”?
To understand more clearly the creditor/payee’s affirmative defense and
the problem of antecedent debt as value, we need to take two steps
backwards.
(1) Bona fide purchase in all its aspects is an equitable defense. A
purchaser who meets its requirements takes free of “prior equities” to which
the property in question would otherwise be subject—for instance, that the
purchaser’s transferor had acquired it by fraud from a third party. Both the
4. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (AM. LAW INST. 1937).
5. Id. at § 14.
6. See infra text accompanying note 48.
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bona fide purchase doctrine in general, and its specific requirements in
particular, are best understood by reference to one of equity’s greatest
(though unwritten) maxims: Equity will do what it can to right an injustice
to one party, but it will stop short at the point where its remedy would do
an injustice to another party. If A is induced by fraud to transfer X to B,
B’s title is defective. A can, therefore, retake X, so long as A can find B with
X still in his possession. However, if B has transferred X to C before A
catches up with him, the inquiry shifts: what were the circumstances in
which C acquired X from B? If it would be inequitable to require C to
restore X to A, A’s rights in the property are cut off by the doctrine of good
faith purchase. (Second prize in the contest between A and C is naturally a
right of recourse against B.)
(2) C qualifies as a bona fide purchaser—and will thus be protected
against A’s claim—if C acquired X as an innocent purchaser for value. This
means that C must have taken the property (i) as a purchaser (and not, for
example, merely as a successor in interest); (ii) without notice (such being
the true meaning of the expressions “innocent” and “in good faith”); and
(iii) for “a valuable consideration,” later shortened to “value.” All three
elements of this test might be explicated as ways to test the overall “balance
of equities” between A and C, but the problematic one has always been
“value.”
The threshold problem is to distinguish the “consideration” required to
make a promise enforceable from the “valuable consideration” needed to
validate a purchaser’s title. Confusion is heightened because the functions
of the two concepts might initially appear similar. Of course, a gratuitous
promisee cannot enforce a contract. In the same way (or so it might seem),
a gratuitous or “donee” transferee cannot take free of prior equities. But
the distinctive characteristics of “value” come into view when we see how
it differs from consideration. In contract law, “promise for promise” is
probably the most common form of consideration there is; yet in its
traditional (pre-U.C.C.) version, a promise of performance constitutes value
only to the extent the promise has been performed. The special status of
the creditor/payee turns on a different aspect of the value question,
historically the most vexed. We would not hesitate to find that a promise
made to satisfy a pre-existing (or “antecedent”) debt was made for
consideration. (To settle my outstanding debt of $500, I promise to deliver
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a cow instead.7) Nor would consideration normally be an issue if I make
you a promise to secure payment of an antecedent debt. If you hold Smith’s
promissory note for $500, and I guarantee payment by adding an
endorsement, my guaranty is not unenforceable for lack of consideration.8
On the score of “value,” however, both transactions were open to question.
If you give me a cow to settle your outstanding debt of $500, and it later
transpires that you obtained the cow from its previous owner by fraud, it is
not at all clear (apart from statute) that I have given value for the cow when
the previous owner comes to reclaim it. If you give me a mortgage on the
same cow to secure the same outstanding debt, it is almost certain that I
have not given value.
These traditional problem areas of “value”—the unperformed promise
of performance, the satisfaction of antecedent debt, the security for
antecedent debt—all come into focus once we see that “consideration” and
“value” are the shorthand answers to entirely different questions. When the
answer is “consideration,” the question is, “have the parties made a
bargain?” But when the answer is “value,” the question is, “has the
transferee undergone a change of position—such that an obligation to restore
the property to the claimant would be inequitable to the transferee?”9 The
case of the unperformed promise (so long as the promise is not irrevocable)
seems the simplest: until I put my hand in my pocket to pay you, I can always
refuse to proceed. “Satisfaction of antecedent debt” is at least doubtful—
If the cow you gave me turns out to belong to someone else so that your

7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 279 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating promise
of a substitute performance gives rise to enforceable “substituted contract”).
8. See U.C.C. § 3-419(b) (2002) (“The obligation of an accommodation party may be
enforced . . . whether or not the accommodation party receives consideration for the
accommodation.”). General principles of suretyship are likewise quick to find—by one means or
another—the consideration necessary to support the surety’s obligation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 9 (1996) (“[T]he requirement of consideration for secondary obligations
is the same as for contracts generally.”).
9. The legal realist quip of the 1930s was that “the defense of purchase for value may be nothing
more than an instance of change of position grown doctrinaire.” Henry Cohen, Change of Position in
Quasi-Contracts, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1342 (1932) (citing an anonymous note at 36 HARV. L REV.
858 (1923)). Other authors have published more earnest statements of the same idea. See
Henry W. Ballantine, Purchase for Value and Estoppel, 6 MINN. L. REV. 87, 121 (1922) (“These are found
in a kind of estoppel which generally exists, even if there is no inquiry in each particular case as to
misreliance on ostensible ownership . . . .”); Stephen Langmaid, Quasi-Contract—Change of Position by
Receipt of Money in Satisfaction of a Preëxisting Obligation, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 319 (1933) (“The significant
point is that the doctrine of purchaser for value, whether at law or in equity, rests upon and is merely
a branch of a more general doctrine of change of position.”).
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antecedent debt to me is reinstated, am I not back where I started? Creditors
objected that they might have forgone various opportunities of recourse,
suggesting at least the potential for a change of position. Nevertheless,
“security for antecedent debt” seemed even harder to justify in these terms.
If you secure a pre-existing debt, not yet at maturity, by giving me a
mortgage on someone else’s cow—and my security turns out to be
illusory—it is hard to see that I am any worse off if I find myself once again
unsecured.
Traditional rules about what constitutes value would be mystifying to
many lawyers today, though they are by no means ancient history. In most
U.S. jurisdictions, before the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
a creditor who took goods in satisfaction of an antecedent debt was not
protected as a bona fide purchaser.10 To this day, it is unlikely that an
unperformed promise or a mortgage securing an antecedent debt will make
one a bona fide purchaser of real property11 or of property transferred in

10. As late as 1948, the leading treatise on sales law still reported that:
Many courts have taken a distinction between chattels and negotiable paper . . . [and] it has been
generally held that taking chattels even in absolute payment of a pre-existing debt does not
constitute the holder a purchaser for value.
...
It has also . . . most commonly been held that one who takes chattels as collateral security for
an antecedent debt is not a purchaser for value.
3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 620, at 397–98 (rev. ed. 1948).
Williston himself took the view that the more liberal definition of value should govern the purchase of
property of any description. Id. at 399–400.
11. According to current authority: “[t]he grantee who gives a promise to pay, as distinct from
an actual payment, is not considered to have given value.” Moreover,
A common problem is raised by the creditor who takes a mortgage or other interest in land as
further security for a pre-existing debt. For example, a bank may make an unsecured loan and
later ask the debtor to give it a mortgage as security. Unless the bank somehow changes its
position detrimentally in return for the mortgage, as by granting an extension of time for
repayment, agreeing to forbear bringing suit, or giving some other concession such as a reduction
in interest rate, it will by the large majority of cases be deemed not to have given value under the
recording acts.
WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10, 880–81 (3d ed. 2000) (citations
omitted). The authors note that the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA), promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1975 and again (after amendment)
in 1977, would have displaced these traditional limits with all-inclusive definition of “value” taken from
the U.C.C. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-201(19) (amended 1977), later withdrawn.
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breach of trust12—though the lawyer who wants to argue in a non-U.C.C.
context that “value” is not identical with “consideration” may have difficulty
mustering modern authorities. The old controversy surrounding the
definition of value tells a story that is simple enough. What began as an
equitable defense, subject to an equitable test, gradually became a
commercial rule in which the underlying equity was no longer discernible.
The parties to recurring commercial transactions—and the judges of their
disputes—wanted predictability and finality more than they wanted equity.
Restitution in any context disrupts a status quo, and a preference for finality
will inevitably leave less room for restitution. Defenses to restitution
expand, and liabilities contract.
Defenses to restitution started with the idea of countervailing equity. Just
as the gist of the action was “that the defendant, upon the circumstances of
the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money,” so the defense was “every thing which shews that the plaintiff, ex
aequo & bono, is not entitled to the whole of his demand, or to any part of
it.”13 The most natural way to make the defensive equitable showing, then
and now, is to point to a change of position on the part of the defendant—
ideally, a change of position in response to the transaction the claimant seeks
to reverse—making it impossible to right one injustice without inflicting
another.
At the outset, even a hard-headed commercial judge like Lord Mansfield
was fully prepared to find that a creditor/payee who could not show a
detrimental change of position was not entitled to a defense. In Buller v.
Harrison,14 an insurance company had paid a claim in the amount of £2,100,
“thinking the loss was fair.” Payment was made to defendant, the London
agent of the policyholders, who themselves were “resident at New York.”
12. Austin W. Scott’s comprehensive treatment of “value” in the context of transfers of trust
property, setting forth all of what are described here as the traditional rules, appeared in the original
Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 298–309 (AM. LAW INST. 1935), reprinted in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 298–309 (AM. LAW INST. 1957). Scott’s treatise (here a commentary on his
own Restatement) repeats the same rules, with additional explanation and numerous citations. For the
most recent full-length version, see 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 298–309.1, at 143–200
(Fratcher, 4th ed. 1989). In a more recent edition of the treatise the discussion of value has been
rearranged and slightly abridged, without substantial change. 5 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & MARK ASCHER,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS §§ 29.3–29.3.12, at 2026–55 (Ascher 5th ed. 2008) (discussing “what
constitutes value for purposes of enabling a transferee of trust property to hold the property free of
trust”).
13. Moses v. Macferlan 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 679–81; 2 Burr. 1005, 1010–12 (K.B. 1760).
14. Buller v. Harrison 98 Eng. Rep. 1243; 2 Cowp. 565 (K.B. 1777).
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Discovering shortly thereafter that in fact, “it was a foul loss,” the insurer
sued the agent to recover the money. Agent’s defense was that his
principals, at the time of the payment, had been indebted to him in the
amount of £3,000, and that he had credited the £2,100 insurance proceeds
against this antecedent debt. Lord Mansfield rejected the defense in
memorable terms:
[S]hall a man, though innocent, gain by a mistake, or be in a better situation
than if the mistake had not happened? Certainly not. In this case, there was
no new credit, no acceptance of new bills, no fresh goods bought or money
advanced. In short, no alteration in the situation which the defendant and his
principals stood in towards each other on the 20th of April. What then is the
case? The defendant has trusted Ludlow and Co. and given them credit. He
trafficks to the country where they live, and has agents there who know how
to get the money back. The plaintiff is a stranger to them and never heard of
their names. Is it conscientious then, that the defendant should keep money
which he has got by their misrepresentation, and should say, though there is
no alteration in my account with my principal, this is a hit, I have got the
money and I will keep it?15

Mansfield’s equitable acid test would prove to be influential. The purpose
of an equitable defense is to foreclose a liability in restitution that would
leave the defendant worse off than if the transaction in question had not
occurred. If the result of allowing the defendant to take free of prior equities
would be to leave the defendant better off than if the transaction had not
occurred—“this is a hit, I have got the money and I will keep it”—the
function of the defense has evidently been perverted. Such is not
infrequently the result, as we shall see, if antecedent debt (however
worthless) counts as value between successive fraud victims.
B. Kent v. Story
The old question of whether the satisfaction of antecedent debt counts
as “value” recurs in many cases of restitution between victims of a common
fraud. This is because the affirmative defense normally allowed to the
creditor/payee is what allows a more fortunate victim—one who has
recovered some of the investment through prior withdrawals—to hold that
money free of the restitution claims of fellow victims from whose funds
such withdrawals were necessarily paid. Concededly, a victim who spends
15. Id. at 1245; 2 Cowp. at 568.
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the funds so withdrawn (not suspecting the fraud) might be able to show a
change of position that Lord Mansfield would have accepted as grounds for
an equitable defense. In other cases, the fact of a prior withdrawal may
simply amount to a lucky break. If satisfaction of antecedent debt
automatically constitutes value in these cases—without asking whether the
recipient has actually given up anything—the result is the repayment of one
victim by a fraud on another, an outcome Mansfield would certainly have
condemned. If the distinction seems unfamiliar, it is because—at least
where payments are concerned—a standard commercial conception of this
three-cornered relationship has long since displaced the original equitable
basis of the affirmative defense.
The American history of the question starts with the landmark case of
Coddington v. Bay,16 in which New York’s highest court affirmed a decision
made in the first instance by its famous Chancellor, James Kent.17
Coddington placed the law of New York in the direct line of Lord Mansfield’s
decision in Buller v. Harrison, and New York held that ground for the rest of
the century—supported by courts in only a handful of states—in opposition
to the rising commercial tide.
Bay, residing in Hudson, New York, owned the schooner Express. He
engaged the firm of Randolph and Savage in New York City to act as his
agents for the sale of the Express on credit, instructing them to take
“unexceptionable paper.” R&S sold the Express for $3,875, taking payment
in the form of negotiable notes which (on a fraudulent pretext) they delayed
remitting to Bay. Eight days after the sale, R&S ceased paying their
creditors. They assigned various assets (including the notes received on the
sale of the Express, belonging in equity to Bay) to another New York firm—
partners named Coddington—to secure them against contingent
“responsibilities.” The Coddingtons were almost but not quite creditors of
R&S at this point; they were accommodation endorsers of some of R&S’s
unmatured notes. But as these notes would fall due in the coming weeks,
and as R&S were now known to be insolvent, it was understandable that the
Coddingtons were eager to have security for the payments they would
shortly be obliged to make on R&S’s behalf. The Coddingtons sold some
of Bay’s notes a few days later, to purchasers having no notice of Bay’s
equitable interest. Bay discovered what had happened and sued the
16. Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), aff”g Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Ch. 54
(N.Y. 1821).
17. Id.
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Coddingtons to recover the remaining notes and the proceeds of the ones
they had already sold.
The defendants argued that they were entitled to the same protection
allowed innocent purchasers of money and bank notes. Chancellor Kent’s
opinion began by recalling the most famous of the authorities on which that
defense was based:
In Miller v. Race, (1 Burr. 452.) a bank note was stolen and came into the hands
of the plaintiff, and he was held entitled to it. But the Court of K. B.
considered bank notes as cash, which passed as money in the way of business;
and the holder, in that case, came by the note, for a full and valuable
consideration, by giving money in exchange for it, in the usual course of his
business, and without notice of the robbery, and on those considerations he
was entitled to the amount of the note.18

By contrast, the Coddingtons were not holders of Bay’s misappropriated
notes “for a valuable consideration within the meaning or within the policy
of the law.”19 A valuable consideration for this purpose—that is, a
consideration sufficiently weighty to cut off prior equities—involved the
sort of change of position that Lord Mansfield had required in Buller v.
Harrison, and that defendants here could not show:
In short, I have not been able to discover a case in which the holder of
negotiable paper, fraudulently transferred to him, was deemed to have as good
a title, in law or equity, as the true owner, unless he received it not only without
notice, but in the course of business, and for a fair and valuable consideration
given or allowed on his part, on the strength of that identical paper. It is the
credit given to the paper, and the consideration bona fide paid on receiving it,
that entitles the holder, on grounds of commercial policy, to such
extraordinary protection, even in cases of the most palpable fraud. It is an

18. Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Ch. 54, 57 (N.Y. 1821). In the case cited by Chancellor Kent,
Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), a highwayman had robbed the mail, taking
a bank note for £2,110. Like paper money today, the note was payable to bearer. The day after the
robbery, someone having “the appearance of a gentleman” used the stolen bank note to pay his hotel
bill. Observing that the innkeeper took the instrument without notice, for a valuable consideration,
and in the ordinary course of business, Lord Mansfield held that he was a protected purchaser of the
note and entitled to enforce it.
19. Id.
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exception to the general rule of law, and ought not to be carried beyond the
necessity that created it.20

Defendants appealed to New York’s Court for the Correction of Errors,
which affirmed Chancellor Kent by a vote of 22–7.21 The published
opinions emphatically approved and largely repeated Kent’s authorities and
reasoning, while adding two arguments that would become hallmarks of
New York law on the subject—henceforth, “the rule of Coddington v. Bay.”
The first was to refute the contention that a creditor/payee’s change of
position might be inferred or presumed if one looked hard enough; in
particular, that a payee who had not actually done anything on receipt of the
claimant’s funds or paper might nevertheless have been “lulled into
inactivity.”22 In New York, a change of position would not be inferred, at
least when the facts of the case made it so unlikely:
It was suggested, that they might have lost the benefit of some other security,
had they not taken these notes; but of this there is no proof or probability. It
is not shown, or pretended, that Randolph and Savage had any other security to
give; and it cannot be presumed, that they would have committed such a
flagrant breach of faith, if they had any other available funds in their hands.23

The second contribution made by the Court for the Correction of Errors
was to underscore Lord Mansfield’s equitable bottom line in Buller. Would
a liability in restitution, under the circumstances of the case, leave the
creditor/payee worse off than if the challenged transaction had never
occurred?
The true test I take to be, that when the holder is left in as good a condition,
after a retransfer, as he would have been had no transfer taken place there, the
title of the owner shall prevail. This allows the rule, so far as it is dictated by
commercial policy, to have its full effect, while it protects the owner of
20. Id. at 58–59.
21. Coddington, 20 Johns. at 658. Under the New York Constitution of 1777, the members of
the state’s highest court included the President and members of the Senate, as well the Chancellor and
the judges of the Supreme Court. N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XXXII.
22. Counsel for the defendant in Buller v. Harrison tried to argue that their client considered the
money as his property at the time it was paid “and for eleven days after,” and that “under this idea he
was lulled into security, and did not take any means during that interval, to get the money from New
York.” Buller v. Harrison 98 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1245; 2 Cowp. 565, 567 (K.B. 1777). Lord Mansfield
ignored this suggestion.
23. Coddington, 20 Johns. at 650.
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negotiable paper, necessarily intrusted, in the course of business, to the care
of agents, from an injury revolting to every principle of moral equity.24

Logically, such a but-for comparison merely paraphrases the equitable test
of change of position, but it does so in a way that makes it intuitive and
unmistakable. The equitable objection, so stated, is one that a non-relying
creditor/payee can never meet, and the mercantile rule that now developed
in contradistinction to the equitable rule did not attempt to meet it. The
rationale of the creditor/payee’s defense, in its mercantile form, was not
equitable at all.
The landmark on the opposite side of the question emerged twenty years
later in Swift v. Tyson,25 decided by the United States Supreme Court in an
opinion by Justice Joseph Story. Swift v. Tyson remains a famous case,
though it is known today for an altogether different point: namely, its clear
statement of the rule that in deciding questions of general commercial law,
the U.S. federal courts were not bound by the judge-made law of the courts
of the several states, but were free to follow their own view of the authorities
and of the relevant principles of law and equity. This collateral issue of
federal jurisdiction required some attention before the Court could reach
the commercial question at the heart of the lawsuit. The case originated in
New York, and one of the parties was arguing that it should be decided in
accordance with New York law—the rule of Coddington v. Bay—even though
the suit was in federal court. Justice Story was determined to announce a
contrary rule about the “valuable consideration” needed to validate a
transfer of commercial paper. As a necessary prelude, he ruled—more
emphatically than the Supreme Court had previously had occasion to do—
that the federal courts were not bound to follow New York commercial law
in deciding a New York case.26
24. Id. at 657 (Vielie, Sen., concurring). All three opinions emphasized this point. See id. at 648
(Woodward, J., concurring) (“If the notes became effectual in their hands, then so much was gained;
if not, they remained in statu quo.”); id. at 650 (Spencer, C.J., concurring) (“If they have to account to
the respondent for these notes, their situation is exactly as it would have been had the notes not been
transferred to them.”).
25. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
26. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided “that the laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded
as rules of decision[,] in trials at common law[,] in the courts of the United States[,] in cases where they
apply.” The question was whether “the laws of the several states” in that context referred only to state
constitutions and statutes, or whether the phrase included the rules of judge-made law that might be
followed in a particular state—for example, the extent of the “valuable consideration” needed to qualify
as a protected holder of commercial paper. According to Story, “[i]t never has been supposed by us,
that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature . . . and
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Norton, a swindler in Maine, purported to sell land to Tyson, a victim in
New York, misrepresenting both the attributes of the land and the state of
his title. Tyson paid Norton for the land by accepting a draft at six months,
drawn by Norton on Tyson and payable to Norton. (The effect was the
same as if Tyson had given Norton a negotiable promissory note due in six
months.) Swift, one of Norton’s creditors, held an overdue note on which
Norton was liable. To redeem the defaulted note, Norton gave Swift several
items of negotiable paper, including the draft that had been accepted by
Tyson. Swift had no notice of any defect in the transaction between Norton
and Tyson. On discovery of the facts, Tyson repudiated the fraudulent land
deal with Norton and refused to honor the draft. Swift sued Tyson, claiming
that as purchaser of the draft for a valuable consideration, he held it free of
prior equities.
What made the case interesting was the assumption on all sides—not
actually tested in this litigation—that Swift would not have been able to
enforce the draft against Tyson in New York, where Tyson resided, because
Swift had not given “valuable consideration” within the rule of Coddington v.
Bay. Justice Story stated a broad rule to the contrary: that a transfer of a
negotiable instrument, either as payment of an antecedent debt or merely as
security for payment, is a transfer “in the usual course of trade and business”
and for valuable consideration—entitling the transferee to enforce the
instrument free of prior equities.27 The part about a transfer for security
was pure dictum, since it was unnecessary to the decision, but it was actually
the key feature of the commercial rule that Story was determined to adopt
for the federal courts.

especially to questions of general commercial law . . . .” Id. at 18–19. Story was probably correct, both
about what had previously been supposed and about what had been intended in 1789. When 19thcentury lawyers spoke of “the rule in Swift v. Tyson,” they were talking about antecedent debt, not “rules
of decision.” But unanticipated consequences of the original reading of the Judiciary Act eventually
became intolerable. Once there had developed, at a few critical points, a significant divergence between
“federal common law” and the common law of a particular state, a plaintiff with access to both state
and federal courts might select the law governing his case—and determine its outcome—by choosing
the court in which to sue. The Supreme Court eventually responded to this problem of “forum
shopping” by holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789—assuming that it meant what Story said it
meant—had been in that respect unconstitutional. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) (describing “forum shopping” as one of the twin evils). The intended result is that state and
federal courts in a given jurisdiction decide non-federal questions by applying the same governing
law—and to a modern lawyer, “the rule in Swift v. Tyson” means only “the rule that was overruled in
Erie v. Tompkins.”
27. Swift, 41 U.S. at 19.
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The reasons given in Swift v. Tyson are interesting for what they leave out.
Unlike Buller and Coddington, they do not refer whatsoever to the parties’
competing equities. After explaining that the federal courts would not take
their law from the courts of New York, Story reached the heart of the
matter:
It becomes necessary for us, therefore, upon the present occasion, to express
our own opinion of the true result of the commercial law upon the question
now before us. And we have no hesitation in saying, that a pre-existing debt
does constitute a valuable consideration, in the sense of the general rule
already stated, as applicable to negotiable instruments . . . . And why, upon
principle, should not a pre-existing debt be deemed such a valuable
consideration?28

The usual answer to Story’s rhetorical question—as he knew perfectly
well—was that a creditor who accepts payment in property not belonging
to his debtor has not necessarily undergone any change of position. If
payment is reversed, the debt is revived, and the creditor may be left where
he started. Of course, the inconvenience to the repaid creditor might in fact
be significant. The question of change of position would be burdensome
to determine in some individual cases, and there are other good reasons not
to adopt such a rule.
But what of the creditor who acquires some third party’s property merely
as security for debts already contracted, and who can show (in
Lord Mansfield’s words) “no new credit, no acceptance of new bills, no
fresh goods bought or money advanced”?29 If the lien is avoided, there will
often be no prejudice to the creditor; while if the lien is enforced, the
creditor is repaid in someone else’s money. There are reasons to recognize
the validity of the pre-existing creditor’s lien, but change of position and
countervailing equity are plainly not among them. Nor did Justice Story
assert that they were:
It is for the benefit and convenience of the commercial world, to give as wide
an extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable paper, that
it may pass not only as security for new purchases and advances, made upon
the transfer thereof, but also in payment of, and as security for, pre-existing
debts. The creditor is thereby enabled to realize or to secure his debt, and
28. Id. at 19–20.
29. Buller, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1245; 2 Cowp. at 569.
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thus may safely give a prolonged credit, or forbear from taking any legal steps
to enforce his rights. The debtor also has the advantage of making his
negotiable securities of equivalent value to cash. But establish the opposite
conclusion, that negotiable paper cannot be applied in payment of, or as
security for, pre-existing debts, without letting in all the equities between the
original and antecedent parties, and the value and circulation of such securities
must be essentially diminished . . . .
What, indeed, upon such a doctrine, would become of that large class of cases,
where new notes are given by the same or by other parties, by way of renewal
or security to banks, in lieu of old securities discounted by them, which have
arrived at maturity? Probably, more than one-half of all bank transactions in
our country, as well as those of other countries, are of this nature. The
doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for
pre-existing debts.30

The emphasis, somewhat unexpectedly, is on the less obvious
proposition: that taking an instrument, not in payment, but merely as security
for a pre-existing debt, is a purchase “for valuable consideration.” Recall
that this part of the rule was unnecessary to a decision of the case, since
Swift had taken Tyson’s paper in payment of Norton’s debt, not as security.
Consider, moreover, how awkward it is to explain that a creditor “gives”
anything—let alone “valuable consideration”—if he merely takes collateral
security for a pre-existing debt. These incongruities offer a hint that the
central concern of Swift v. Tyson is not what appears at first glance.
The facts made it a case of owner v. creditor. On such facts, the rule of
Swift v. Tyson is that the creditor takes free of the owner’s rights: he is
“unaffected with the equities between the antecedent parties.”31
Justice Story’s real concern, however, is not with the restitution case of
owner v. creditor, but with the strictly commercial case of creditor v.
creditor. The critical function of the commercial rule, in other words, was
not to cut off the rights of “antecedent parties” such as defrauded owners,
but to confirm the validity of a transfer between “immediate parties”—
typically a bank and its customer. The transactions that Story is describing
boil down to this: Borrower delivers negotiable notes to his banker to serve
as collateral security for outstanding loans or acceptances and future
advances. If Borrower’s loans are of longer maturity than his collateral,
Borrower will eventually have to furnish substitute collateral—probably in
30. Swift, 41 U.S. at 20.
31. Id. at 19.
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the form of more notes. Does the banker acquire a valid security interest in
the substitute collateral? Once in a great while, the person challenging the
banker’s lien might be a defrauded prior owner, as in Coddington v. Bay. More
often, the problem would be a challenge by Borrower’s other creditors,
upon Borrower’s insolvency, to the validity (or priority) of the bank’s lien.
A pledge of collateral between Borrower and bank was not valid until the
bank gave “value.”32 The system of credit that Story describes could
survive the occasional case like Coddington v. Bay—the New York banks do
not appear to have suffered appreciably from the New York rule. The “fatal
blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing debts” would
have been to tolerate any doubt about the validity of the security
arrangements on which the bank’s priority depended.
New York courts indignantly rejected the result in Swift v. Tyson, though
they eventually accepted Story’s point about the market for commercial
paper. Consideration that might be “good” or “sufficient” to validate a
transfer between the immediate parties—a debtor’s payment on account, or
his pledge to secure past or future advances—was not the consideration of
“actual value” required “to protect the holder of a negotiable security which
has been passed to him in fraud of the rights of others.”33 New York thus
distinguished the commercial case of creditor v. creditor, where the issue
was normally priority, from the restitution case of owner v. creditor, where
the issue was prior equities.34 In the decades of controversy that followed,
New York won the adherence of a number of state courts, but a majority
preferred Story’s simpler, unitary rule.35
32. See 1 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 1.6 (1965). In the same way, the
threshold condition for the enforceability of an Article 9 security interest—the requirement that “value
has been given,” U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1)—makes it essential that “value” be given when rights are
acquired “as security for . . . a preexisting claim,” U.C.C. § 1-204(2).
33. Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93, 99 (N.Y. 1843).
34. To cut off prior equities, a defendant had to show “something more than a good
consideration, a consideration which would be sufficient as between the parties to the transaction . . . .
[Rather,] the consideration must be valuable and actually paid, and . . . the defendant must have parted
with value upon the faith of the purchase.” Weaver v. Barden, 49 N.Y. 286, 291 (1872).
35. Reviewing the decisions on either side of the question, the Illinois court noted that “[t]he
fact that the various courts of this country are so arrayed against each other upon this question is the
best possible evidence of its intrinsic difficulty.” Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 490, 493 (1865). But
Illinois sided with Swift v. Tyson, finding that the taking of negotiable paper as security for a pre-existing
debt would normally imply a forbearance on the part of the creditor.
We have only to add, that the line of decisions which we follow contributes to that stability in
negotiable paper which is so important a consideration in a mercantile community. To
accomplish this has been the constant tendency of judicial decisions from the time of
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Statutes eventually put an end to the discussion, so far as negotiable
instruments were concerned. According to the English Bills of Exchange
Act (1882):
Valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by,—
(a) Any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract;
(b) An antecedent debt or liability. Such a debt or liability is deemed
valuable consideration whether the bill is payable on demand or at a future
time.36

The Act encouraged the use of the word “value” as a relatively colorless
substitute for “valuable consideration”37—facilitating the understanding
that the expression was really a term of art, and that a “valuable
consideration” in this context need not be “valuable” in any literal sense. In
the U.S. paraphrase that followed soon after, the Bills of Exchange Act
became the Negotiable Instruments Law—promulgated in 1896 as the first
of the “uniform laws” proposed (by a newly-formed commission) for
adoption by the legislatures of the several states:
Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An
antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such whether
the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.38

New York adopted the NIL in 1897, but ten years later the New York Court
of Appeals was still enforcing the rule of Coddington v. Bay.39 As the Court
later explained, “the New York rule was so well established that the inertia

Chief Justice Holt to the present day. The value of this stability to commerce is acknowledged
by all courts, and by all writers upon mercantile law. It is easy to see how much it strengthens
credit and facilitates the multitudinous transactions of a commercial people.
Id. at 498. According to a well-known modern appraisal, “the much heralded quest for legal uniformity
that Swift v. Tyson is supposed to have represented can also be seen more concretely as an attempt to
impose a procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts.” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 250 (1977). But unwilling state courts were
by this point few and far between.
36. Bills of Exchange Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. ch. 61, § 27(1).
37. See id. 61, § 2 (“‘Value’ means valuable consideration”).
38. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 32 (1896) reproduced in UNIF. NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS ACT § 25 U.L.A. app. I (1943).
39. Bank of America v. Waydell, 187 N.Y. 115, 120 (1907).
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of Coddington v. Bay carried it along for some distance before the external
force of the Negotiable Instruments Law acted upon it.”40
III. VICTIM V. VICTIM RESTITUTION
Modern practice makes it unlikely that one Ponzi victim would assert
claims directly against another, though a suit for restitution by “net losers”
against “net winners” would certainly be possible as a matter of doctrine.41
Instead, the victims’ claims inter se are adjudicated indirectly—by the
receivers who are typically charged by federal courts to marshal assets in the
wake of the scheme and to recommend an equitable distribution between
multiple victims. A standard “net loss” approach incorporates two legal
doctrines that potentially increase the share of some victims and the expense
of others, as a result of circumstances that may be entirely fortuitous. The
rule that satisfaction of antecedent debt constitutes “value,” when applied
“no questions asked”—thereby making the debt of an insolvent swindler as
“valuable” for this purpose as an obligation of the U.S. Treasury—means
that victims who have previously withdrawn some or all of their investments
will not have to share such payouts with victims who withdrew nothing.
The rule that permits an owner to reclaim stolen property—so long as it
remains identifiable—means that net losses may well be determined by the
accident of which victim’s assets happen to remain on hand. If a swindler
gets dollars from me and Swiss francs from you, then spends the dollars and
keeps the francs in his desk drawer, you recover your currency (and reduce
or eliminate your net loss), while my loss is 100%.
There can be no objection to these results if the net loss is the proper
baseline for an equitable distribution. A fraud victim who has persuaded a
swindler to repay some of the money, or who is lucky enough to find some
of his property intact, naturally suffers a smaller loss than he would have
otherwise—like a burglary victim whose jewelry is recovered when the thief
is arrested. Recent decisions in the post-Ponzi context reject these
consequences as inequitable because they reject the net loss baseline. The
courts do not put it in those terms. What they say is that the incidence of
losses between victims similarly situated should not be allowed to depend
on mere fortuity: the chance of identification; the sequence of events; or the
accident of whose money a swindler happens to spend first. But if the
40. Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N.Y. 528, 536–37 (1918).
41. For an indication of how the claim might be framed, see generally Andrew Kull, Common-Law
Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 939 (2012).
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victims are indeed “similarly situated,” it is because their entitlements are
properly fixed at the outset—when they first part with their money—not in
the aftermath of the fraud, when losses are “net.”
These basic rules about antecedent debt and retaking one’s own property
are not subject to serious challenge, so long as transactions take place in an
ordinary commercial context. By contrast, the respective entitlements inter
se of victims of a common fraud have at times received different treatment.
There are venerable decisions that refuse to apply the rule of “antecedent
debt” to the discharge of an obligation that was spurious from the outset.
The more fundamental rule—that a dispossessed owner can retake his
identifiable property—has plainly been harder to overcome, but (as we shall
see) recent decisions in post-Ponzi cases have denied even this.
The first problem, concerning antecedent debt, is easier to see in its
classic, two-party setting than in the multi-victim Ponzi version. Swindler
obtains money from Victim 1, giving a forged note secured by a lien on
property he does not own. When Victim 1 demands repayment, Swindler
repeats his successful fraud with Victim 2—borrowing again on the same
pretended security, and directing Victim 2 to repay Victim 1 to discharge the
imaginary prior lien. If these facts can be established, V1 is prima facie liable
to V2 in restitution. The question then becomes whether V1’s innocent
acceptance of V2’s money in satisfaction of V1’s claim against Swindler
constitutes a purchase for value, giving V1 a defense to V2’s claim.
The same question arises in a post-Ponzi setting when (as is often the
case) some earlier, more fortunate victims have previously withdrawn funds
from the scheme, and where any funds they withdrew were necessarily
obtained from subsequent victims of the same fraud. The recipients of
these payouts will claim the protection normally afforded to
creditor/payees—explaining that they took the funds, without notice of the
fraud, in reduction of Swindler’s preexisting obligation to them.
Recognition of this affirmative defense yields the conventional rule
governing Ponzi withdrawals: recipients can keep them free of liability in
restitution, but only to the amount of their original investments.42 The
effect of the rule is that entitlements as between victims—assuming there
remains something to allocate—are proportional to net losses, defined as
aggregate investments minus aggregate withdrawals.

42. See, e.g., Donnell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (defining the net-loss rule
governing Ponzi withdrawals).
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Proportional allocation based on initial investments would instead require
that all previous withdrawals be made subject to restitution, enabling a
ratable distribution overall. Courts have shied away from this conclusion.
A rule requiring restitution by the innocent recipients of Ponzi payouts is
unattractive for several reasons, including the expense of collection and the
likelihood that many of the recipients will have changed position by
spending the money. Recent decisions have nevertheless taken a notable
half-step in this direction, approving new methods of distribution whose
tendency is to equalize losses in proportion to investments—but only so far
as this can be done without imposing on any victim an affirmative liability
to repay funds previously withdrawn.43
The second branch of the net loss dilemma, in which Swindler spends my
dollars but holds on to your francs, presents a more fundamental difficulty.
A rule of share and share alike, or ownership in proportion to original
contributions, is not only familiar but inevitable in any case where multiple
owners’ property has been “confused” or “commingled.”44 So if the
dishonest warehouseman has taken my wheat and your wheat, stored them
in the same elevator, and converted some of the mixture, you and I own the
residue in proportion to what we had originally stored. The result is the
same if your money and my money are commingled in Swindler’s bank
account in a way that makes the funds untraceable. What makes some
recent Ponzi cases controversial is that receivers want to apply a rule of share
and share alike to reassign property that remains readily identifiable.45
43. The new approach substitutes what is called the “rising-tide method” of distribution for the
traditional “net loss method.” See infra text accompanying note 62.
44. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1879, 1905 (2001) (“[W]hen goods of similar nature belonging to different parties are intermixed in
such a way as to make their separation impossible,” the normal solution is “co-ownership in proportion
to the relative contribution of the properties involved.”).
45. In the earliest of this line of decisions, SEC v. Elliott, victims “loaned” their securities to
Swindler, delivering registered certificates with stock powers attached. Most of the securities entrusted
in this way had been sold and the proceeds lost; some had been left untouched, still registered in the
names of the victims who had “loaned” them. The receiver (with the approval of the district court)
refused to restore these securities to their previous owners. Doing so “would create inequitable results,
in that certain investors would recoup 100% of their investment while others would receive
substantially less.” SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit agreed:
“Legally, these investors occupy the same position as the other investors whose securities were sold.
All investors were defrauded. All investors were cleverly persuaded to part with their securities.” Id.
In United States v. Durham, the funds of 13 victims had been commingled in Swindler’s bank account,
which had a closing balance of over $83,000 when the scheme was halted. United States v. Durham,
86 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1996). One of the last victims was able to identify $70,000 of this balance as the
product of its own contribution, based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the relevant deposit was
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A judicial refusal to restore identifiable property to its owners is impossible
to explain in terms of existing rules, and the courts that have refused have
not tried to explain—other than to say that the net loss result does not seem
to be fair. It might nevertheless be possible to discern an evolving doctrine
in these cases that the courts have not expressed for themselves. The
proposal to be made is that these outcomes are reached by what might be
called “commingling fictions”—a radical departure from ordinary property
law, but no more radical (perhaps) than the “tracing fictions” that were the
creation of 19th-century equity, and not so different in purpose.
A. Creditor or Fellow Victim?
The first systematic account of the modern law of restitution, published
by the American Law Institute in 1937, treated the mercantile rule for
creditor/payees as one of its most basic propositions. Chapter 2 on
“Mistake, Including Fraud” included among its “Definitions and General
Rules” a standard version of bona fide purchase:
§ 13. BONA FIDE PURCHASER.
A person who has entered into a transaction with another under such
circumstances that, because of a mistake, he would be entitled to restitution
from the other,
(a) is not entitled to restitution from a third person who has received title
to or a legal interest in the subject matter either from the other or from the
transferor at the direction of the other, and has given value therefor
without notice of the circumstances[.]46

This was immediately followed by a partial definition of the term “value”—
mostly the part about antecedent debt:
§ 14. DISCHARGE FOR VALUE.
(1) A creditor of another or one having a lien on another’s property who
has received from a third person any benefit in discharge of the debt or lien,
made subsequent to the final withdrawal. Id at 72. Finding that this claimant’s ability to trace its funds
was “the result of the merely fortuitous fact that the defrauders spent the money of the other victims
first,” the lower court “elected in the interest of equity to distribute the $83,000 pro rata.” Id. The
Fifth Circuit announced that it would not “chain the hands of the court in Equity to do what is right
under the circumstances.” Id. at 73. For additional decisions in this vein, see Kull, supra note 1, at 298–
306 (2014).
46. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1937).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss2/2

24

Kull: Victim v. Victim Restitution: The Commingling Fictions

2020]

VICTIM V. VICTIM RESTITUTION

333

is under no duty to make restitution therefor, although the discharge was given
by mistake of the transferor as to his interests or duties, if the transferee made
no misrepresentation and did not have notice of the transferor’s mistake.47

In their published notes on these sections, the ALI’s Reporters—Warren
Seavey and Austin Scott of the Harvard Law School—dismissed the naive
idea that the rules of purchase for value reflected any concern with equitable
outcomes. A purchaser from a thief obtained no protection, while the same
purchase from an “embezzling trustee” might yield good title:
In neither case is there a moral issue involved. The question is one of legal
mechanics, or the operation of rules which determine who, as between equally
innocent persons, is entitled to the subject matter . . . .
It becomes clear, therefore, that as a new matter and from the standpoint
of justice the result reached in any particular case might equally well be
opposite to the result now reached under the rules. In other words, the rules
as to bona fide purchase are not, as are the rules normally applicable to
questions involving restitution, based upon the balance of justice between the
parties, but merely upon technicalities.48

The Reporters seem to be saying that in an important subset of cases,
lying very close to the core of the subject, the law of restitution is
unconcerned with equitable outcomes. This was an overstatement, if only
because a purchaser for valuable consideration normally has changed
position in some significant way. But their idea might be restated in less
provocative terms. Without question, a rule that treats creditors/payees as
purchasers for value will yield results that are inequitable in particular cases.
(The most objectionable outcomes are probably those whereby a loss is
fortuitously shifted from the party who would appropriately bear it to a party
whose relation to the loss-making transaction is that of an innocent
bystander.49) Moreover, it is true that the rules of purchase for value—to
47. Id. § 14. The wording is awkward, since it is the transferee who gives the discharge (and the
value), but the meaning is apparent.
48. W.A. Seavey & A.W. Scott, Notes on Certain Important Sections of Restatement of Restitution 7–8
(1937).
49. For example, as the result of a leading modern decision allowing the defense:
Apart from the administrative expense of straightening things out—a cost that is negligible if the
matter is not litigated—Security Pacific’s payment mistake has not in fact caused any loss to the
parties. The only real loss anywhere on the horizon—and the only reason the parties are in
court—is the loss of $2 million caused by Spedley’s default. The only significant consequence of
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the extent they diverge from change of position—appear essentially amoral
on this point, and finally, it is also true that courts will frequently tolerate
inequitable outcomes for the sake of mercantile objectives that they consider
more important than “the balance of justice between the parties.”
Conceding all this, the cases in which claimant and defendant are
successive victims of the same fraud still do not fit neatly with the others.
It is not that these victim v. victim cases all come out the other way. But
when this element is added to the facts, otherwise uniform authority is
suddenly divided, confidence wavers, and judicial reasoning is visibly
perplexed.
To explain the scope and meaning of “discharge for value,” Seavey and
Scott first offered five garden-variety illustrations of owner v. creditor
claims—cases in which the availability of the creditor/payee’s defense is
undisputed. They set the tone with this uncontroversial example:
1. A, believing that he is devisee of B, mortgages his share in B’s estate to
C who, in order to sell the subject matter, pays D who has a prior mortgage
thereon. In fact A is not B’s devisee and has no share in B’s estate. C is not
entitled to restitution from D.50

After four more illustrations, much like this one, the atmosphere changed
abruptly:
6. A steals an automobile and mortgages it to B who lends him $500
thereon. A then borrows $700 from C, telling C of B’s mortgage. In
accordance with his agreement with A, C pays B $500 to discharge B’s
mortgage and gives A $200, taking a mortgage for $700. The owner of the
car reclaims it. C is not entitled to restitution from B.
7. Purporting to be the owner of Blackacre A borrows $5,000 from B,
forging a note and mortgage in the name of the record owner of Blackacre.
Security Pacific’s mistake is that this loss on the Spedley loan has been fortuitously shifted from
Banque Worms (which voluntarily assumed the associated credit risk and was paid for doing so)
to Security Pacific (which had nothing to do with the loan transaction from which the loss
resulted). The result in Banque Worms cannot be justified by reference to superior risk bearing,
because the risk in question does not correlate to the loss being assigned.
Andrew Kull, Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REV. 919, 922 (2001) (discussing
Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int’l, 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991)).
50. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14, Ill. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1937). The illustration is
based on a famous English restitution case, Aiken v. Short, 156 Eng. Rep. 1180, 1 H. & N. 210 (Exch.
1856).
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A then borrows $10,000 on a similarly forged mortgage of Blackacre from C
who pays B $5,000 to discharge B’s forged mortgage and to surrender the
forged note and pays A the remaining $5,000. C is not entitled to restitution
from B.51

By juxtaposing the owner v. creditor and the successive-fraud illustrations
without a word of transition, the Reporters were implying that the cases
were fundamentally the same. Their notes show that they knew better:
In Illustrations 6 and 7 . . . the difficulty is that the payee never had a claim
which was of substantial value . . . . Because of this, Mr. Patterson and Mr.
Thurston, of the Advisers, believe that the payee had, in substance, lost his
money when he originally lent the money to the thief or forger . . . . [Yet] the
results in Illustrations 6 and 7 are consistent with the reasons for the doctrine
of bona fide purchaser, since the payee acquired title to the money and
surrendered something of technical value. In both of these cases the forger
has defrauded both parties; the fact that the payee would have suffered had
the technical rules as to bona fide purchaser not applied, is immaterial since
this is frequently true in such cases . . . . The cases clearly support the results
of Illustrations 1–5. Upon Illustrations 6 and 7 the cases in point are neither numerous
nor unanimous.52

In fact, the victim v. victim cases are surprisingly numerous, and their very
marked division of authority would have allowed the Reporters, within the
ordinary usages of the American Law Institute, to state the opposite
outcomes for Illustrations 6 and 7.
To distinguish the successive fraud cases from the run of the mill, it
would have been necessary to acknowledge that—at least as between fraud
victims—the surrender of merely “technical value,” such as an antecedent
debt that was manifestly worthless, could not constitute the “valuable
consideration” that the doctrine of bona fide purchase originally purported
to require. Reasons to resist such a distinction are not hard to reconstruct.
To suggest that “value” sometimes has to be really valuable would seriously
complicate the definition. It would imply the existence of different
categories of cases—more or less mercantile, more or less concerned with
“the balance of justice”—whose differentiation would inevitably be a matter
of difficulty. More generally, it would surrender some of the ground that

51. Id. at § 14, Ill. 6–7.
52. Seavey & A.W. Scott, supra note 48, at 125 (emphasis added).
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had been steadily gained for the mercantile approach over the century
following since Swift v. Tyson, by acknowledging—contrary to the Reporters’
professed convictions—that the rules of purchase for value were sometimes
concerned with equity after all.
The Reporters’ tactical decision made the law simpler to restate, but it
made their Restatement of this point simpler than the reality. “Discharge
for value,” followed too uncritically by the “bona fide payee” of Restatement
Third, describes the result for the vast majority of ordinary-course
commercial transactions, but the judicial response to the victim v. victim
scenario is more complex. Unable to escape the inherited formulation of
the problem, the decisions for and against restitution pursue an old debate
about the status of antecedent debt as “value,” while the most telling
objection to restitution in victim v. victim cases is rarely acknowledged. The
real problem is that—when the parties have been victims of the same
fraud—granting restitution does not obviously do any more for the balance
of justice between the parties than denying it.
The facts of the classic successive-fraud cases were more entertaining
than their schematic paraphrase in the Restatement’s Illustrations 6 and 7, and
the authorities were divided in a way the official text did not acknowledge,
but the arguments on either side were mostly predictable. Judges who
favored restitution saw a mistaken payment by V2 to V1, with no change of
position by V1 and no “value” given in exchange:
We are disposed to agree that an irrevocable change of position by
defendant, so that a recovery will result in a loss to him, that is, put him in a
worse position than he would have occupied had the money never been paid
him, is a good defense to a recovery . . . . [But in] the case at bar we are unable
to see that defendant, by receiving payment of his mortgage from plaintiff,
and giving up the evidences of the supposed debt . . . lost anything of value.
The precise claim in this regard is that, had the payment not been made,
defendant, when the mortgage became due, would have discovered that the
mortgage was a forgery, and would have received payment from O’Donnell,
who had not yet absconded, but was still doing business in Duluth. This claim
is too uncertain and speculative. The evidence as to the dealings of O’Donnell
warrant no inference that he would have paid the mortgage, but, on the
contrary, convince us that he would either have forged a new mortgage in
renewal of the old; or, if he feared discovery of his crimes, would have left the
country, as he did do later. He was not in the business of paying his debts,
but of obtaining money through forgery and fraud, and it is not shown that
he could have been forced to pay. We conclude that the only reasonable
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inference is that, had plaintiff not paid defendant, he would be to-day the
holder of a forged note and mortgage, but of nothing else in the way of
satisfaction for the money O’Donnell procured of him through fraud.53

Judges who denied the restitution claim responded that the defendant had
suffered at least a theoretical change of position through loss of recourse,
even if the debtor was finishing his career in the penitentiary. A defendant
who surrendered a forged note and mortgage “has been damnified to some
extent,—how much cannot be told,—if she has to lose the money paid to
her.”54 There had been at least “technical value,” in other words, so long
as the law refused to permit any examination of what an antecedent debt
was actually worth. The underlying reason to deny restitution between
victims, on this approach, was to avoid unsettling the protection of
creditor/payees in the standard commercial setting:
She received [payment] in good faith, in satisfaction of a just and equitable
claim, and when it was due, on honor and in conscience. And the authorities
are uniform that where the money is received in good faith, and in the ordinary
course of business, and for a valuable consideration, it cannot be recovered
back because the money was fraudulently obtained of some other person by
the payor. To hold otherwise would be to put every man who receives money
53. Grand Lodge, AOUW of Minnesota v. Towne, 161 N.W. 403, 407 (Minn. 1917). Compare
the dissenting opinion in Walker v. Conant:
Mrs. Conant, by releasing her mortgage, did not release her debt against Van Riper. Her claim
still remains as good as it ever was against him. Mr. Walker never received anything from her, or
any one else, for the money he let her have. The mortgage she discharged was the only thing she
parted with for it, and that was worthless and void. Under such circumstances, to permit Mrs.
Conant to withhold the money she received from Mr. Walker would not only be inequitable and
unjust, but would be allowing her to reap the fruits of the crime committed by young Van
Riper . . . . It is said by my Brother MORSE, in regard to Mrs. Conant’s giving up her note and
mortgage: “Her situation is changed, and without her fault, beyond all possible return or
restoration.” If by this it is meant she has given up for destruction a forged note and mortgage
which she received for a loan of money made, it is true; but if by it is meant that her legal or
equitable rights are changed, in the event she is obliged to return the money she received of Mr.
Walker, I confess my inability to discover such change.
Walker v. Conant, 37 N.W. 292, 296 (Mich. 1888) (Sherwood, C.J., dissenting). The same Morse and
Sherwood, C.J., had been the authors one year earlier of the competing opinions in Sherwood v. Walker,
the most famous example of mutual mistake in American contract law. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W.
919 (Mich. 1887). The case involved the sale of a purebred Aberdeen-Angus cow, Rose 2d of Aberlone,
believed at the time of sale (by the seller at least) to be infertile but discovered shortly thereafter to be
with calf.
54. Walker, 37 N.W. at 294.
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in the due course of his business upon inquiry, at his peril, as to the manner
in which such money was procured by the payor.55

The implicit proposition here—that the goal of assuring the finality of
payments or “security of receipt” supersedes our usual interest in equitable
outcomes—is more readily acceptable today than it was a century ago. Both
then and now, however, the special case of victim v. victim restitution seems
to attract further reasoning or second thoughts. The defendant appears, not
in the light of a creditor, but of a fellow victim. The argument for restitution
emphasizes that the first victim’s loss should not be arbitrarily shifted to a
subsequent victim identically situated:
[T]he defendant had been deceived and cheated out of his money, and had
taken worthless notes therefor, and there would seem to be no reason for
holding that he should be indemnified in the result of a like fraudulent
deception practiced by the same impostor upon the plaintiff.56

But if equities were equal, there was no reason to shift the loss in the other
direction either. This equitable rationale for doing nothing appears
prominently in the classic case of Concord Coal Co. v. Ferrin.57 An imaginative
rogue named Bean had invented some sort of “appliance.” (In light of what
happened, Bean’s invention probably had something to do with coal.) Bean
asked the defendants, who were apparently machinists, to make a model of
his invention, then failed to pay them for their work. When the machinists
pressed for payment, Bean told them that the Concord Coal Co.
was backing him, and that he would get the plaintiff company to furnish a ton
of coal for application as payment upon his indebtedness; and the defendants
agreed to accept a ton of coal in part payment. Bean thereupon informed the
plaintiffs that the defendants wanted a ton of coal, without saying anything
about the arrangement he had made with them. The coal was delivered to the
defendants and used by them in their business.58

55. Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
56. Strauss v. Hensey, 9 App. D.C. 541, 547 (1896). Cf. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Boston v.
Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Mass. 1945) (“Before the plaintiff even considered
making the payment to the defendant, the defendant had already lost its money, although it did not
realize the fact.”).
57. Concord Coal Co. v. Ferrin, 51 A. 283 (N.H. 1901).
58. Id. at 283–84.
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When the coal company sent a bill for the coal, the machinists refused to
pay; they had credited the value of the coal against Bean’s debt to them.
When the coal company sued in restitution to recover the value of the coal,
the machinists responded that their own equitable position was just as good
as that of the plaintiffs. The New Hampshire court agreed with them:
It is contended that the plaintiffs can recover because otherwise the
defendants would be unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs’ expense. But that fact
is not found. Both parties trusted and were deceived by Bean. If the plaintiffs
cannot recover of the defendants for the coal, they have a claim against Bean
for its value; while, if the defendants were obliged to pay for the coal, they
would also have a claim against Bean for the same amount. It may be assumed
that Bean is worthless. But there is no equitable reason why the plaintiffs
rather than the defendants should be released from the consequences of their
trust in Bean.59

In another representative decision denying restitution, the court relied
principally on the conventional idea that V1 had received V2’s money for
what the court deemed a valuable consideration—namely, the surrender of
a note given by Swindler, secured by a stolen automobile. But there was a
deeper reason as well:
If we look at this case from a purely equitable viewpoint, the result to which
we must come will not be different than that above announced . . . . [I]f
respondent was innocent, so was the appellant. The equities in favor of the
respondent are not less great than those running with the appellant. We think
the judgment of the trial court [denying restitution] was right, and it is
affirmed.60

If two victims are identically situated, then, the question comes down to
this: whether the inability to demonstrate a superior equity is more harmful
to the cause of action for unjust enrichment or to an innocent recipient’s
defense. Judicial views were plainly divided, and either answer—indeed, the
question itself—seems unsatisfactory. If the task is to decide, as courts on
either side of the question have routinely assumed, “which of the innocent

59. Id. at 285.
60. Gaffner v. American Finance Co., 206 P. 916, 918 (Wash. 1922). The court appears to have
been briefly confused about which party was the appellant, but the intended meaning is clear: “if the
[claimant] was innocent, so too was the [defendant].”
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parties must bear a loss caused by the forgery and fraud,”61 and if moreover
there is no equitable reason to shift a loss either one way or another, then
the affirmative defense in victim v. victim cases may be simply a matter of
inertia. The accepted formulation of the problem, in which a claim to
recover a mistaken payment is met with some sort of defense, to be judged
good or bad, means that the remedy is all or nothing. It leaves no room for
the obvious possibility that between victims similarly situated, the loss
should be shared. The newer post-Ponzi cases have been trying to find a
way to do this.
B. The Commingling Fictions
The fortuitous nature of most casualty losses is an undeniable feature of
human affairs, and it may seem curious that the federal courts should start
trying to counteract the effects of luck and chance in this one particular set
of cases. If your gold and my silver are stored side by side in the same
warehouse, and a dishonest warehouseman steals proportionately more of
one than of the other, subsequent adjustments will be on a net loss basis,
with no one suggesting that losses be equalized between bailors similarly
situated. One reason for the greater innovation in the post-Ponzi cases may
be the simple fact that the property to be allocated between victims—
thereby normalizing losses—is already in the hands of the court or its
receiver. A court that might refuse to allow one victim to reclaim negotiable
securities from Swindler’s desk drawer would find it far more difficult to
distribute them ratably if, for some fortuitous reason, the securities had
already been restored to their previous owner.
The same practical difficulties obstruct any direct attempt to recover
earlier (and disproportionate) payouts to Ponzi victims. Assume that
A and B have each invested $1,000 in the same fraudulent scheme. By the
time the fraud is revealed, A has already withdrawn $500, but B has
withdrawn nothing. So long as A is entitled to the usual affirmative defense
as creditor/payee—and thus entitled to retain the money withdrawn—a net
loss allocation treats these victims very differently. Ratable allocation in
proportion to original investments would necessarily deny the defense,
requiring A to repay the money withdrawn and allowing the receiver to
distribute the fund (so augmented) in equal shares.
Courts have perceived this possibility as a theoretical matter, but they do
not pursue it, because they perceive even more clearly the difficulty of
61. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Boston, 61 N.E.2d at 19.
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retrieving prior distributions from their fortunate recipients. But a method
of distribution adopted in some recent cases—called “rising tide” as
opposed to net loss—is a half step in this direction: it works to equalize
losses in proportion to original investments, but only so far as this can be
done without requiring anyone to repay funds previously withdrawn. The
rising tide allocation method takes a composite approach. While A’s
withdrawals are not required to be repaid in cash, they are nevertheless
counted (i) as part of the assets theoretically available for distribution and
(ii) against A’s ratable share of those assets (based on initial investments).
Thus while A and B have a right to share equally in whatever the receiver
has been able to collect, A will be treated as having already received the first
$500 of his distributive share. In other words, A will forgo his 50% share
of future distributions until the amount of distributions forgone by A equals
$500.62
If ratable recovery in proportion to original losses constitutes justice
between Ponzi victims, it should apply equally to the two-party case with
which these questions began—in which Swindler defrauds V1, then tricks
V2 into repaying V1. Accepted methods of restitution cannot achieve this
result. A binary, all-or-nothing approach that either protects the repaid
earlier victim as a purchaser for value, or else denies protection on the
ground that value has not been given, will either shift the loss or leave things
alone. Accepting this limitation leads quickly to the unattractive
proposition, endorsed by the 1937 Restatement, that these cases are decided
by technical rules to which considerations of justice are irrelevant.
To recapitulate: the money originally paid by V1 to Swindler is gone
forever; the money paid by V2 to V1 is sitting in V1’s bank account; and
62. See Kull, supra note 1, at 306–12, for a closer description of “rising tide” distribution. Rising
tide is described in cases as if it were an equitable improvisation, based purely on a receiver’s sense of
fairness, but it finds a close analogy in an established technique of trust administration known as
“equitable recoupment.” If we accept the starting proposition about the Ponzi victims’ relative
entitlements—that they are fixed by reference to initial investments rather than net losses—then a
victim who has received a prior distribution from the scheme resembles a trust beneficiary who has
been paid more than his rightful share of trust income. When a trustee has overpaid one of several
beneficiaries, and there remain trust assets for future distribution, the authorities recognize a doctrine
whereby (i) the overpaid beneficiary may or may not be affirmatively liable to restore the
overpayment—certainly not, if he has changed position—but (ii) the amount of the overpayment may
at any rate be recouped, so far as possible, by deduction from his share of future distributions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 254 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959); see 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 25.2.4 at 1848 (5th ed. 2007) (absent change of
position, “there is no reason why the [overpaid] beneficiary should be permitted to profit at the expense
of . . . the other beneficiaries”).
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there is no other money to argue about. Existing rules tell us that this
residue of Swindler’s fraud belongs to one victim or the other—depending
on whether V1 has an affirmative defense or not. To share losses between
V1 and V2 it is necessary to recharacterize the ownership of both victims’
funds. The necessary rule is one by which assets entrusted to Swindler—
whether by V1, V2, or Vn, and whether traceable or not—become, from
that moment on, part of a commingled fund belonging to all victims in
proportion to their contributions.
Such a rule would work an unthinkable alteration to ordinary property
concepts, except that—on the story presented here—it is a rule toward
which the recent Ponzi cases have been moving. It is the rule already being
applied when a court refuses to allow a fraud victim to retake identifiable
property, and it is the proposition underlying the rising tide or
“recoupment” half-step.
The problem arises in an area where ownership already depends, in
important instances, on equitable modifications of legal rules. Suppose that
V2’s funds—instead of being paid over to V1—are paid instead into
Swindler’s bank account, where there is a pre-existing balance of Swindler’s
own funds. Swindler then withdraws and dissipates half. By ordinary legal
logic, V2’s interest in Swindler’s bank account could only be an undivided
fraction of the combined balance, and his funds must, therefore, have been
diminished pari passu by Swindler’s dissipation. The result is otherwise, but
only because the legal logic of ownership has been modified, by main force,
to do justice between a wrongdoer and his victim. The first and most
important of the tracing fictions, known as “the rule of Jessel’s Bag,”
imposes a presumption that when a wrongdoer combines money of a victim
with money of his own, then spends part of the commingled fund, he is
spending his own money first—giving the victim first claim on whatever
remains in the account.63 The presumption has nothing whatever to do
63. Knatchbull v. Hallett (In re Hallett’s Estate), 13 Ch. D. 696, 727–28 (Ct. App. 1880). The rule
is named for the following passage in the opinion of the Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel:
The simplest case put is the mingling of trust moneys in a bag with money of the trustee’s own.
Suppose he has a hundred sovereigns in a bag, and he adds to them another hundred sovereigns
of his own, so that they are commingled in such a way that they cannot be distinguished, and the
next day he draws out for his own purposes £100, is it tolerable for anybody to allege that what
he drew out was the first £100, the trust money, and that he misappropriated it, and left his own
£100 in the bag? It is obvious he must have taken away that which he had a right to take away,
his own £100.
Id. at 727.
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with the facts and usually flies in their face. It permits an artificial
identification of what is, in reality, unidentifiable.
A rule by which assets contributed by fraud victims become, from that
moment, part of a commingled fund, belonging to all victims as a class, is
like Jessel’s Bag in reverse. Instead of a tracing fiction, it is a
commingling fiction, imposing a presumptive confusion of assets that, in
reality, remain identifiable. Instead of justice between victim and
wrongdoer, it pursues justice between the wrongdoer’s victims inter se. It
may be objected that the equities between fraud victims are not nearly so
obvious as the equities between a wrongdoer and his victim. This takes us
back to the starting point, where the question is whether net loss or initial
investment is the proper baseline for the victims’ relative entitlements. But
if the recent Ponzi decisions are right about the equities of victim v. victim
restitution, their commingling fictions do no more violence to property rules
than the established tracing fictions—equitable modifications that it would
now seem hard to do without.
IV. CONCLUSION
Decisions that refuse to permit a dispossessed owner to retake
identifiable property may at first appear lawless. They disregard what courts,
until recently, would have understood to be coherent and binding authority
in an area of the law—that of equitable rights and remedies—that has
become less familiar to the U.S. legal profession. If the outcomes are seen
as desirable nevertheless, they might be thought to illustrate Holmes’s
wonderful apothegm that “[i]gnorance is the best of law reformers.”64
It is true that the courts in these cases do not acknowledge—indeed, they
seem to be unaware of—the doctrinal obstacles to what they are doing. But
the departure from legal rules in deeming identifiable property to be
“commingled” is arguably no more radical than that of Sir George Jessel in
deeming commingled funds to be identifiable. In his ability to introduce
such a departure, the Master of the Rolls enjoyed important advantages over
modern judges. Beyond a comprehensive and confident command of equity
jurisprudence, he had the advantage of a conceptual starting-point that has
been largely lost to modern American law. This is the idea that equity is
different; that legal rules do not necessarily apply in equity; and that the
power to supplement or modify legal outcomes is the chief reason why
equity exists.
64. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 78 (1881).
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The reporters of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution chose to paper over
well-known doubts about the extent to which commercial rules about
antecedent debt, renamed “discharge for value,” should apply outside an
ordinary business setting. Few courts since then have shown any inclination
to revisit the question; the Restatement (Third), published in 2011, missed an
important opportunity to describe a more nuanced rule.65 Seen against this
background, the departure from authority by some courts and receivers in
recent Ponzi cases may be a sign of fresh equity thinking. The fact that their
opinions make no attempt to situate the new outcomes within established
doctrine has simultaneously enabled and disguised these interesting
developments.

65. The most important modern decision to reject “discharge for value” is probably
Wilson v. Newman. Wilson v. Newman, 617 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. 2000). The new Restatement pointed to
Wilson v. Newman to acknowledge a contrary line of authority, but did not otherwise depart from Seavey
and Scott. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 rep. n. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2011). The failure in 2011 to suggest any significant qualification to the mechanical rule of
1937 was a regrettable lapse by the reporter.
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